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Abstract
Recent advances in Representation Learn-
ing and Adversarial Training seem to suc-
ceed in removing unwanted features from the
learned representation. We show that de-
mographic information of authors is encoded
in—and can be recovered from—the inter-
mediate representations learned by text-based
neural classifiers. The implication is that de-
cisions of classifiers trained on textual data
are not agnostic to—and likely condition on—
demographic attributes. When attempting to
remove such demographic information using
adversarial training, we find that while the
adversarial component achieves chance-level
development-set accuracy during training, a
post-hoc classifier, trained on the encoded sen-
tences from the first part, still manages to
reach substantially higher classification accu-
racies on the same data. This behavior is
consistent across several tasks, demographic
properties and datasets. We explore several
techniques to improve the effectiveness of the
adversarial component. Our main conclusion
is a cautionary one: do not rely on the adver-
sarial training to achieve invariant representa-
tion to sensitive features.
1 Introduction
Consider automated systems that are used for de-
termining credit ratings, setting insurance policy
rates, or helping in hiring decisions about individ-
uals. We would like such decisions to not take
into account factors such as the gender or the race
of the individual, or any other factor which we
deem to be irrelevant to the decision. We refer to
such irrelevant factors as protected attributes. The
naive solution of not including protected attributes
in the features to a Machine Learning system is
insufficient: other features may be highly corre-
lated with—and thus predictive of—the protected
attributes (Pedreshi et al., 2008). For example, in
Credit Score modeling, text might help in credit
score decisions (Ghailan et al., 2016). By using
the raw text as is, a discrimination issue might
arise, as textual information can be predictive of
some demographic factors (Hovy et al., 2015) and
author’s attributes might correlate with target vari-
ables (Zhao et al., 2017).
In this paper we are interested in language-
based features. It is well established that textual
information can be predictive of age, race, gender,
and many other social factors of the author (Kop-
pel et al., 2002; Burger et al., 2011; Nguyen et al.,
2013; Weren et al., 2014; Verhoeven and Daele-
mans, 2014; Rangel et al., 2016; Verhoeven et al.,
2016; Blodgett et al., 2016), or even the audience
of the text (Voigt et al., 2018).
Thus, any system that incorporates raw text into
its decision process is at risk of indirectly condi-
tioning on such signals. Recent advances in rep-
resentation learning suggest adversarial training
as a mean to hide the protected attributes from
the decision function (Section 2). We perform a
series of experiments and show that: (1) Infor-
mation about race, gender and age is indeed en-
coded into intermediate representations of neural
networks, even when training for seemingly un-
related tasks and the training data is balanced in
terms of the protected attributes (Section 4); (2)
The adversarial training method is indeed effec-
tive for reducing the amount of protected encoded
information... (3) ...but in some cases even though
the adversarial component seems to be doing a
perfect job, a fair amount of protected informa-
tion still remains, and can be extracted from the
encoded representations (Section 5.1).
This suggests that when working with text data
it is very easy to condition on sensitive properties
by mistake. Even when explicitly using the adver-
sarial training method to remove such properties,
one should not blindly trust the adversary, and be
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careful to ensure the protected attributes are in-
deed fully removed. We explore means for im-
proving the effectiveness of the adversarial train-
ing procedure (section 5.2).1
However, while successful to some extent, none
of the methods fully succeed in removing all de-
mographic information. Our main message, then,
remains cautionary: if the goal is to ensure fair-
ness or invariant representation, do not trust
adversarial removal of features from text in-
puts for achieving it.
2 Learning Setup
We follow a setup in which we have some la-
beled data D composed of documents x1, ..., xn
and task labels y1, ..., yn. We wish to train a clas-
sifier f that accurately predicts the main task la-
bels yi. Each data point xi is also associated with
a protected attribute zi, and we want the decision
yi = f(xi) to be oblivious to zi. Following (Ganin
and Lempitsky, 2015; Xie et al., 2017), we struc-
ture f as an encoder h(x) that maps x into a rep-
resentation vector hx, and a classifier c(h(x)) that
is used for predicting y based on hx. If hxi is
not predictive of zi, then the main task prediction
f(xi) = c(h(xi)) does not depend on zi.
We say that a protected attribute z has leaked
if we can train a classifier c′(hxi) to predict zi
with an accuracy beyond chance level, and that
the protected attribute is guarded if we cannot
train such a classifier. We say that a classifier
f(x) = c(h(x)) is guarded if z is guarded, and
that it is leaky with respect to z if z leaked.
Adversarial Training In order to make f obliv-
ious to z, we follow the adversarial training setup
(Goodfellow et al., 2014; Ganin and Lempitsky,
2015; Beutel et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2017). Dur-
ing training, an adversarial classifier adv(hx) is
trained to predict z, while the encoder h is trained
to make adv fail. Concretely, the training proce-
dure tries to jointly optimize both quantities:
arg min
adv
L(adv(h(xi)), zi)
arg min
h,c
L(c(h(xi)), yi)− L(adv(h(xi)), zi)
where L(y′, y) is the loss function (in our case,
cross entropy). This objective results in creating
the representation hx s.t. it’s maximally infor-
mative for the main task, while at the same time
1The code and data acquisition are available in: https:
//github.com/yanaiela/demog-text-removal
minimally informative of the protected attribute.
The optimization is performed in practice using
the gradient-reversal layer (GRL) method (Ganin
and Lempitsky, 2015). The GRL is a layer gλ
that is inserted between the encoded vector hx
and the adversarial classifier adv. During the for-
ward pass the layer acts as the identity, while dur-
ing backpropagation it scales the gradients passed
through it by −λ, causing the encoder to receive
the opposite gradients from the adversary. The
meta-parameter λ controls the intensity of the re-
versal layer. This results in the objective:
arg min
h,c,adv
L(c(h(xi)), yi)+L(adv(gλ(h(xi))), zi)
Attacker Network To test the effectiveness of
the adversarial training, we use an attacker net-
work att(hx). After the classifier c(h(x)) is fully
trained, we use the encoder to obtain representa-
tions h, and train the attacker network to predict
z based on h, without access to the encoder or to
the original inputs x that resulted in h. If, after
training, the attacker can predict z on unseen ex-
amples with an accuracy of beyond chance level,
then the attribute z leaked to the representation,
and the classifier is not guarded.
Network Architecture In our setup, an example
xi is a sequence of tokens w1, ..., wmi and the en-
coder is a one layer LSTM network that reads in
the associated embedding vectors and returns the
final state: h = LSTM(w1:m). The classifier c
and the adversarial adv are both multi-layer per-
ceptrons with one hidden layer, sharing the same
hidden layer size and activation function (tanh).2
3 Data, Tasks, and Protected Attributes
To perform our experiments, we need a reasonably
large dataset in which the data-points x contain
textual information, and for which we have both
main-task labels y and protected attribute labels
z. While our motivating example used prediction
tasks for credit rating, insurance rates or hiring
decisions, to the best of our knowledge there are
no publicly available datasets for these sensitive
tasks that meet our criteria. We thus opted to use
much less sensitive main-tasks, for which we can
obtain the needed data. We focus on Twitter mes-
sages, and our protected attributes are binary-race
(non-hispanic Whites vs. non-hispanic Blacks),
2Further details regarding the architecture and training
parameters can be found in the supplementary materials.
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binary-gender (Male vs. Female)3 and binary-age
(18-34 vs. 35+). As main tasks we chose bi-
nary emoji-based sentiment prediction and binary
tweet-mention prediction. Both the sentiment and
the mention prediction tasks are not inherently
correlated with race, gender or age. Protected at-
tributes leakage in these seemingly benign main-
tasks is a strong indicator that such leakage is
likely to occur also in more sensitive tasks.
Main Tasks: Sentiment and Mention-detection
Both tasks can be derived automatically from twit-
ter data. We construct a binary “sentiment” task
by identifying a subset of emojis which are asso-
ciated with positive and negative sentiment,4 iden-
tifying tweets containing these emojis, assigning
them with the corresponding sentiment and re-
moving the emojis. Tweets containing emojis
from both sentiment lists are discarded. The bi-
nary mention task is to determine if a tweet men-
tions another user, i.e, classifying conversational
vs. non-conversational tweets. We derive this
dataset by identifying tweets that include @men-
tions tokens, and removing all such tokens from
the tweets.
Protected: Race The race annotation is based
on the dialectal tweets (DIAL) corpus from (Blod-
gett et al., 2016), consisting of 59.2 million tweets
by 2.8 million users. Each tweet is associated with
predicted “race” information which was predicted
using a technique that takes into account the geo-
location of the author and the words in the tweet.
We focus on the AAE (African-American En-
glish) and SAE (Standard American English) cat-
egories, which we use as proxies for non-Hispanic
blacks and non-Hispanic whites.
We chose only annotations with confidence (the
probability of the authors’ race) of above 80%.
Due to its construction, the race annotations in this
dataset are highly correlated with the language be-
ing used. As such, the data reflects an extreme
case in which the underlying language is very pre-
dictive of the protected attribute.
Protected: Age and Gender We use data from
the PAN16 dataset (Rangel et al., 2016), contain-
ing manually annotated Age and Gender informa-
tion of 436 Twitter users, along with up to 1k
3While gender is a non-binary construct, many decisions
in the real-world are unfortunately still influenced by hard
binary gender categories. We thus consider binary-gender to
be a useful approximation in our context.
4Complete list is available in Appendix C
tweets for each user. User annotation was per-
formed by consulting the user’s LinkedIn profile.
Gender was determined by considering the user’s
name and photograph, discarding unclear cases.
Age range was determined by birth-date which
was published on the user’s profile, or by mapping
their degree starting date.
Data-splits From the DIAL corpus we extracted
166K and 10K tweets for training and develop-
ment purpose respectively (after cleaning and ex-
tracting relevant tweets), whereas for the PAN16
dataset we collected 160K tweets for training and
10K for development. The train/development split
in both phases of the training (task-training and
attacker-training) is the same. This is the worst
possible scenario for the attacker, as it is train-
ing on the exact representations the adversary at-
tempted to remove the protected attribute from.
Each split is balanced with respect to both the
main and the protected labels: a random predic-
tion of each variable is likely to result in 50% ac-
curacy.
Metrics Throughout this paper, we measure
leakage using accuracy. We say that the protected
attribute has leaked if an attacker manages to pre-
dict the protected attribute with better than 50%
accuracy, which is always the probability of that
attribute (P (Z) = 0.5). In Appendix A we re-
late our metric to more standard fairness metrics,
and prove that in our setup a guarded predictor
guarantees demographic parity, equality of odds,
and equality of opportunity. Note however that
we also show empirically that such guarded pre-
dictors are very hard to attain in practice.
4 Baselines and Data Leakage
In-dataset Accuracy Upper-bounds We begin
by examining how well can we perform on each
task (both main-tasks and protected attributes)
when training the encoder and classifier directly
on that task, without any adversarial component.
This provides an upper bound on the protected at-
tribute leakage for the main tasks results. The re-
sults in Table 1 indicate that the classifiers achieve
reasonable accuracies for the main tasks.5 For
5While the sentiment score may seem low, we manually
verified the erroneous predictions and found out that many
of them are indeed ambiguous with respect to sentiment, e.g.
sentences like “I can’t take Amanda seriously ” and “You
make me so angry, yet you make me so happy. ” which
were predicted negative and positive respectively, but their
gold label was the opposite.
3
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M+P+M+P−
M−P− M−P+
(a) balanced
M+P+
M+P−
M−P−
M−P+
(b) unbalanced
Figure 1: Balanced (a) vs. Unbalanced (b)
dataset. Red(M+)/Blue(M-): Main Task.
Light(P+)/Dark(P-): Protected attribute. Each
class is globally balanced, but in (b) the propor-
tion of the protected attribute within each main
task split is unbalanced.
the protected attributes, race is highly predictable
(83.9%) while age and gender can also be recov-
ered at above 64% accuracy.
Data Task Accuracy
DIAL Sentiment 67.4
Mention 81.2
Race 83.9
PAN16 Mention 77.5
Gender 67.7
Age 64.8
Table 1: Accuracies when training directly towards
a single task.
Leakage When training directly for the protected
attributes, we can recover them with relatively
high accuracies. But is information about them
being encoded when we train on the main tasks?
In this set of experiments, we encode the train-
ing and validation sets using the encoder trained
on the main task, and train the attacker network
to predict the protected attributes based on these
vectors. This experiment suggests an upper bound
on the amount of leakage of protected attributes
when we do not actively attempt to prevent it.
The Balanced section in Table 2 summarizes the
validation-set accuracies. While the numbers are
lower than when training directly (Table 1), they
are still high enough to extract meaningful and
possibly highly sensitive information (e.g. DIAL
Race direct prediction is 83.9% while DIAL Race
leakage on the balanced Sentiment task is 64.5%).
Leakage: Unbalanced Data The datasets we
considered were perfectly balanced with respect
to both main task and protected attribute labels
(Figure 1a). Such extreme case is not represen-
tative of real-world datasets, in which a dataset
may be well balanced w.r.t. the main task la-
bels but not the protected attribute. For exam-
ple, when training a classifier to predict a fit
for managerial position based on Curriculum Vi-
tae (CV) of candidates, the CV dataset may be
perfectly balanced according to the managerial /
non-managerial variable, but, because of existing
social biases, CVs of females might be under-
represented in the managerial category and over-
represented in the non-managerial one. In such
a situation, the classifier may perpetuate the bias
by learning to favor males over females for man-
agerial positions. We simulate this more realis-
tic scenario by constructing unbalanced datasets
in which the main tasks (sentiment/mention) re-
main balanced but the protected class proportions
within each main class are not, as demonstrated in
Figure 1b. For example, in the sentiment/gender
case, we set the positive-sentiment class to con-
tain 80% male and 20% female tweets, while the
negative-sentiment class contains 20% male and
80% female tweets. We then follow the leakage
experiment on the unbalanced datasets. The at-
tacker is trained and tested on a balanced dataset.
Otherwise, the attacker can perform quite well on
the male/female task simply by learning to pre-
dict sentiment, which does not reflect leakage of
gender data to the representation. When training
the attacker on balanced data, its decisions cannot
rely on the sentiment information encoded in the
vectors, and must look for encoded information
about the protected attributes. The results in Ta-
ble 2 indicate that both task accuracy and attribute
leakage are stronger in the unbalanced case.
Leakage: Real-world Example The above ex-
periments used artificially constructed datasets.
Here, we demonstrate leakage using a popular en-
coder trained for emotion detection: the Deep-
Moji encoder (Felbo et al., 2017) trained to predict
the most suitable emoji usage for a sentence (one
of 64 in total), based on 1.2 billion tweets. The
model is advertised as a good encoder for encod-
ing sentences into a representation that is highly
predictive of sentiment, mood, emotion and sar-
casm. Does it also capture protected attributes?
We encode the sentences of the different protected
attributes using the DeepMoji encoder and train
three different attackers to predict race, gender
and age. The best scores on the development set
are 84.7%, 67.2% and 67.1% respectively. This
should not come as a surprise, as indeed some
4
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Balanced Unbalanced
Data Task Protected Attribute Task Acc Leakage Task Acc Leakage
DIAL Sentiment Race 67.4 64.5 79.5 73.5
Mention Race 81.2 71.5 86.0 73.8
PAN16 Mention Gender 77.5 60.1 76.8 64.0
Age 74.7 59.4 77.5 59.7
Table 2: Protected attribute leakage: balanced & unbalanced data splits.
emoji usage is highly correlated with these prop-
erties.
5 Mitigating Data Leakage
Leakage of protected attributes information into
the internal representation of the network when
training on seemingly unrelated tasks is very com-
mon. We explore the means of mitigating such
leakage.
5.1 Adversarial Training
We repeat the experiments in Table 2 with an ad-
versarial component (Ganin and Lempitsky, 2015)
as described in Section 2, in order to actively re-
move the protected attribute information from the
encoded representation during training. Note that
the adversarial objective is in odds with the main-
task one: by removing the protected attribute in-
formation from the encoder, we may also hurt its
ability to encode information about the main task.
Figure 2 shows the main task and adversary pre-
diction accuracies on the development set as train-
ing progresses, for the Sentiment/Race pair.
Figure 2: Main task and Adversary accuracy
curves for Sentiment/Race.
After an initial peak in task prediction accuracy,
the adversary prediction drops and starts to fluctu-
ate around chance level (50%), as desired, along
with a drop in main task accuracy as well. The
adversary’s accuracy remain around chance level
throughout the entire training process, suggesting
that the adversarial training is indeed effective for
removing the protected attribute information from
the encoded representation. These trends are per-
sistent for all main-task/protected-attribute pairs
we tried.
However, training the attacker network on the
resulting encoder vectors reveals a different story.
For example, when considering the encoder after
50 training epochs (adversary accuracy of 49.0%),
the attacker reaches 56.0% accuracy: substantially
higher than the adversarial’s success rate, despite
sharing the exact same architecture, and being
trained and tested on the exact same dataset.
Table 3 summarizes the attacker’s recovery rate
on the adversarialy-trained encoders for the dif-
ferent settings. In all cases, the adversarial’s suc-
cess rate is around 50%, while the attacker’s rate is
substantially higher. The attacker’s rates are lower
than in Table 1, indicating the adversarial train-
ing is effective in removing some of the protected
attribute. However, a substantial amount of in-
formation managed to leak past the adversary,
despite its seemingly perfect performance.
Data Task ProtectedAttribute
Task
Acc Leakage ∆
DIAL Sentiment Race 64.7 56.0 5.0
Mention Race 81.5 63.1 9.2
PAN16 Mention Gender 75.6 58.5 8.0
Mention Age 72.5 57.3 6.9
Table 3: Performances on different datasets with
an adversarial training. ∆ is the difference be-
tween the attacker score and the corresponding ad-
versary’s accuracy.
Attacker’s Accuracy on Unseen Data We ver-
ify that the attacker’s recovery accuracy persists
also on the more realistic scenario in which the
attacker is applied to encoded sentences that did
not participate in the adversarial training. We con-
structed an additional dataset of 166K completely
unseen samples from the Sentiment/Race case. As
expected, the attacker works even better in this
5
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case, reaching an accuracy of 59.7% Vs. 56.0%
on the original development set.
5.2 Strengthening the Adversarial
Component
We explore means of strengthening the adversarial
component, by tuning its capacity and its weight,
as well as by using a novel adversarial-ensemble
configuration.
Capacity We increase the capacity of the adver-
sarial component by increasing its hidden dimen-
sion, while keeping the attacker’s hidden dimen-
sion constant at 300 dimensions. We try hidden di-
mensions of size 500, 1000, 2000, 5000 and 8000.
Weight We experiment with different weighting
of the adversarial component during training by
tuning the λ parameter, trying the values 0.5, 1.0
(default), 1.5, 2, 3, 5 (with values above 5 the main
task training became extremely unstable, not rais-
ing above 50%).
Ensemble An alternative to using larger λ val-
ues is to introduce several adversaries. The po-
tential benefit of this approach is that rather than
focusing harder on removing a single feature, here
the different adversaries could each focus on a dif-
ferent aspect of the representation. This approach
is potentially better suited to deal with language
variability. Concretely, we suggest the following
adaptation to the adversarial loss to incorporate k
adversaries with different random initializations:
Ly(c(h(x)), y) +
k∑
j=1
Lz(advj(gλ(h(x))), z)
Other Attempts We also experienced with sev-
eral other techniques: reinitializing the adversar-
ial weights every t epochs; training the adver-
sary without propagating the error to the encoder
components for t epochs and only then starting
to propagate; using adversaries with more hidden
layers; adding dropout on the encoded vectors and
within the encoder. None of these yielded im-
provements over the above methods.
Results All methods are effective to some ex-
tent, Table 4 summarizes the results.
Increasing the capacity of the adversarial net-
work helped reduce the protected attribute’s leak-
age, though different capacities work best on each
setup. On the Sentiment/Race task, none of the
higher dimensional adversaries worked better than
the 300-dim one, on the PAN16 dataset it did.
On PAN16/Gender the 8000-dim adversary per-
formed best, and on PAN16/Age, the 500-dim
one.
Increasing the weight of the adversary through
the λ parameter also has a positive effect on the
result (except on the Sentiment/Race pair). How-
ever, too large λ values make training unstable,
and require many more epochs for the main-task
to stabilize around a satisfying accuracy.
The adversarial ensemble method with 2 adver-
saries achieves 57.4% on Sentiment/Race, as op-
posed to 56.0% with a single one, but when using
5 different adversaries, we achieve 54.8%. On the
PAN16 dataset larger ensembles are more effec-
tive. However, a potential issue with the ensemble
method is that larger ensembles reduces training
stability, similar to increasing the λ value. For ex-
ample, with 5 adversaries, the main-task accuracy
remained at random for 5 epochs, and only begun
rising at the 6th epoch. Using 10 adversaries, the
main task could not be trained.
To summarize, while all methods are effective
to some extent, it appears that (a) no method and
parameter setting performs equally well across the
different setups; and (b) no method succeeds in
completely preventing the leakage of the protected
attributes. Combining the different methods (en-
sembles of larger networks, larger networks with
larger λ, etc.) did not improve the results.
Unbalanced Data Results We repeated the
same set of experiments on the unbalanced Sen-
timent/Race corpus (Table 5). In this setup, the
results are somewhat similar: increasing the ad-
versarial capacity and λ is ineffective, and even
increases the attacker’s recovery rate. However,
using an ensemble of 5 adversaries does manage
to reduce the leakage, but it is still far from a sat-
isfying result.
6 Analysis
The gap between the adversary’s dev-set accu-
racy and the after-the-fact attacker accuracy on the
same data is surprising. To better understand the
phenomenon, we perform further analysis on the
Sentiment/Race pair with the default single adver-
sary.
Embedding Vs. RNN Recall that the attacker
network tries to extract as much information from
6
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DIAL PAN16
Method Parameter Sentiment Race ∆ Mention Gender ∆ Mention Age ∆
No Adversary Baseline - 67.4 14.5 - 77.5 10.1 - 74.7 9.4 -
Standard Adversary (300/1.0/1) 64.7 6.0 5.0 75.6 8.5 8.0 72.5 7.3 6.9
Adv-Capacity 500 64.1 6.7 5.2 73.8 8.1 6.7 71.4 4.3 4.1
1000 63.4 7.1 4.9 75.2 8.9 7.0 71.6 6.3 4.0
2000 65.2 8.1 6.9 76.1 6.7 6.4 71.9 6.0 5.7
5000 63.9 6.2 3.7 74.5 5.6 1.6 73.0 10.2 9.6
8000 65.0 7.1 4.8 75.7 5.4 4.2 71.9 9.8 7.3
λ 0.5 63.9 6.8 6.2 75.6 7.8 6.8 73.1 4.8 3.4
1.5 64.9 7.4 5.4 75.6 4.9 2.4 72.5 6.8 5.8
2.0 64.2 7.3 5.9 76.0 -7.2 6.7 72.1 8.5 7.7
3.0 65.8 10.2 10.1 73.7 6.4 6.1 72.5 -6.3 5.2
5.0 50.0 - - 73.6 6.5 5.7 69.0 3.2 2.9
Ensemble 2 62.4 7.4 5.4 74.8 6.4 5.0 72.8 8.8 8.3
3 66.5 6.5 5.0 75.3 4.9 3.1 72.1 6.7 6.0
5 63.8 4.8 2.6 74.3 4.1 3.0 70.1 5.7 5.4
Table 4: Results of different adversarial configurations. Sentiment/Mention: main task accuracy.
Race/Gender/Age: protected attribute recovery difference from 50% rate by the attacker (values be-
low 50% are as informative as those above it). ∆: the difference between the attacker score and the
corresponding adversary’s accuracy. The bold numbers are the best oblivious classifiers within each
configuration.
Method Param Sentiment Race
No Adversary Baseline - 79.5 23.5
Standard Adversary 1.0 76.8 10.6
Adv-Capacity 500 74.8 13.8
1000 70.5 18.4
2000 73.9 18.5
5000 71.5 19.4
8000 73.6 18.7
Lambda 0.5 75.0 15.5
1.5 71.2 18.2
2.0 73.0 12.1
3.0 71.5 12.0
5.0 50.0 -
Ensemble 2 70.6 20.8
3 73.6 17.9
5 71.5 8.6
Table 5: Unbalanced Sentiment/Race with the dif-
ferent methods. Sentiment: task accuracy. Race:
Attacker’s recovery accuracy beyond 50%.
the encoder’s output as possible. The encoder con-
sists of two components: (1) Embedding Matrix
and (2) an RNN. Therefore, the leakage can be
caused due to one of them (or due to their combi-
nation).
We conduct the following experiment to deter-
mine which part affects the leakage more: we cre-
ate a new encoder by composing 2 existing en-
coders: an encoder with high leakage (Leaky, us-
ing the baseline encoder) and an encoder with low
leakage (Guarded, using the 5-Ensemble adver-
sary). We fuse the two encoders by combining the
embedding matrix of the Leaky encoder with the
RNN module of the Guarded encoder, and vice
versa. This yields two new encoders: an encoder
with a “leaky” Embedding Matrix module and a
“strong” RNN module (Leaky-EMB), and an en-
coder with a “strong” Embedding Matrix mod-
ule and a “leaky” RNN module (Leaky-RNN). We
compare encoders Leaky-EMB and Leaky-RNN to
gauge which module has a greater contribution to
the data leakage. We train attacker-networks over
the encoders’ output to predict the protected at-
tributes.
Embedding
Leaky Guarded
R
N
N Leaky 64.5 67.8
Guarded 59.3 54.8
Table 6: Accuracies of the protected attribute with
different encoders.
Table 6 summarize the results, implying that the
leakage is caused mainly by the RNN, and less by
the Embedding Matrix.6
6A discrepancy exists to some extent in the new en-
coders, as their parts originate from different models that
were trained separately. To test if the fusion is valid, we train
a different classifier on top of the new encoders to predict
the main task. The combination of the leaked RNN with the
guarded embeddings results in 65.4% on the sentiment task
and the other combination results in 60.9% as opposed to
67.5% and 63.8% on the leaked and guarded models, respec-
tively. As the new models are on par with the original ones,
we conclude that the new encoders are valid.
7
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Consistent Leakage: Examples Inspection
We are interested in tweets whose protected at-
tribute (race) is correctly predicted by the adver-
sary. However, at accuracy rates below 60%,
many of the correct predictions could be attributed
to chance. To identify the relevant examples, we
repeated the Sentiment/Race default adversary ex-
periment 10 times with different random seeds.
We then trained 10 attacker networks, and used
each of them to label all examples in the devel-
opment set. We then looked for tweets which are
consistently and correctly classified by at least 9
attackers.7 Table 7 shows some of these cases.
Many of them include tokens (Naw, Bestfrand,
tan) and syntactic structures (Going over Bae
house) which are indeed predictive, though not the
most salient features.
Leakage via Embeddings Even though we
found out the RNN is much more responsible to
the leakage then the Embedding, those still con-
tribute to the leakage and are easier to inspect.
Therefore, we turn to inspect the encoders’ Em-
bedding. We hypothesize that a possible rea-
son for the adversarial network’s inability to com-
pletely remove the protected race information is
word frequency. Namely, rare words, which
might be strongly identified with one group, didn’t
get enough updates during training and therefore
remained predictive towards one of the groups.
To quantify this, we compared two vocabularies:
words appearing in tweets where the predictions
were consistently predicted (9 or 10 out of 10
times) by the different attackers, and words ap-
pearing in tweets that were randomly distributed
(50%) between the attackers. If our hypothe-
sis is correct, we expect words from the sec-
ond group to be more frequent than words in the
first group. We discard words appearing in both
groups, and associate each word with its training
set frequency. One-tailed Mann-Whitney U test
(Mann and Whitney, 1947) showed the effect is
highly significant with p < e−12.
Data Overfitting? Standard ML setups often
suffer from overfitting on the training data, es-
pecially when using neural-networks which tend
to memorize the data they encounter. In the ad-
versarial setup, the overfitting could result in the
encoder-adversary pair working together to per-
fectly clean the attributes from the training data,
7776 correct and 946 consistent examples in total
without generalization. Such overfitting could ex-
plain the attacker success. Is this what happened?
We test this hypothesis by using the same at-
tacker networks experiments solely on the train-
ing data. We train the attackers on 90% of the
training data while using the rest 10% as held-
out. If overfitting has occurred, the accuracy is
likely to result in 50% accuracy. Alas, this is not
the case. Table 8 summarize the training accura-
cies of the attacker network. The Mention/Race
task achieves the highest score of 64.3% whereas
the Mention/Gender task achieves the lowest -
58.1%. Even though when trained directly to pre-
dict these attributes without the adversarial setup,
the training accuracies are much higher, a substan-
tial amount of signal is still left, even in the train-
ing data.
7 Related Work
The fact that intermediary vector representa-
tions that are trained for one task are predic-
tive of another is not surprising: it is at the
core of the success of NLP methods for deriv-
ing “generic” word and sentence representations
(e.g. Word2vec (Mikolov et al., 2013), Skip-
thought vectors (Kiros et al., 2015), Contextual-
ized Word Representations (Melamud et al., 2016;
Peters et al., 2018) etc.). While usually consid-
ered a positive feature, it can often have undesired
consequences one should be aware of and poten-
tially control for. Several works document bi-
ases and stereotypes that are captured by unsuper-
vised word embeddings (Bolukbasi et al., 2016;
Caliskan et al., 2017) and ways of mitigating them
(Bolukbasi et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2018). Bias
and stereotyping were also documented on a com-
mon NLP dataset (Rudinger et al., 2017). While
these work are concerned with the learned rep-
resentations encoding unwanted biases about the
world, our concern is with capturing potentially
sensitive demographic information about individ-
ual authors of the text.
Removing sensitive attributes (demographic or
otherwise) from intermediate representations in
order to achieve fair classification has been ex-
plored by solving an optimization problem (Zemel
et al., 2013), as well as by employing adversar-
ial training (Edwards and Storkey, 2015; Louizos
et al., 2015; Xie et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2018),
focusing on structured features. Adversarial train-
ing was also applied for Image anonymization
(Edwards and Storkey, 2015; Feutry et al., 2018).
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AAE (“non-hispanic blacks”) SAE (“non-hispanic whites”)
My Brew Eattin I want to be tan again
Naw im cool Why is it so hot in the house ?!
Tonoght was cool Been doing Spanish homework for 2 hours .
My momma Bestfrand died I wish I was still in Spain
Enoy yall day Ahhhhh so much homework .
Going over Bae house TWITTER-ENTITY I miss you too !
She not texting or calling ? Ok I want to move to california
Real relationships go thru real shit Lol , I don’t even go here .
About to spend my entire check IDGAF Ahhhhh so much homework .
Getting ready for school I’m so tired .
Table 7: Examples for correct dialectal/race predictions, which were predicted consistently by at least 9
different attacker-classifiers.
Data Task ProtectedAttribute ∆
DIAL Sentiment Race 12.2
Mention Race 14.3
PAN16 Mention Gender 8.1
Mention Age 9.7
Table 8: Attacker’s performance on different
datasets. Results are on a training set 10% held-
out. ∆ is the difference between the attacker score
and the corresponding adversary’s accuracy.
In contrast, we consider features that are based on
short user-authored text.
Several works apply adversarial training to tex-
tual data, in order to learn encoders that are in-
variant to some properties of the text (Chen et al.,
2016; Conneau et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017;
Xie et al., 2017). As their main motivation is to
remove information about domain or language in
order to improve transfer learning, domain adap-
tation, or end task accuracy, they were less con-
cerned with the ability to recover information
from the resulting representation, and did not eval-
uate it directly as we do here.
Recent work on creating private representation
in the text domain (Li et al., 2018) share our mo-
tivation of removing unintended demographic at-
tributes from the learned representation using ad-
versarial training. However, they report only the
discrimination accuracies of the adversarial com-
ponent, and do not train another classifier to verify
that the representations are indeed clear of the pro-
tected attribute. As our work shows, trusting the
adversary is insufficient, and external verification
is crucial.
Finally, our work is motivated by the desire for
fairness. We use a definition in which a fair clas-
sification is one that does not condition on a cer-
tain attribute (fairness by blindness), and evaluate
the ability to achieve text-derived representations
that are blind to a property we wish to protect.
Many other definitions of fairness exist, including
demographic parity, equality of odds and equal-
ity of opportunity (see e.g. discussion in (Hardt
et al., 2016; Beutel et al., 2017)). Under our setup,
blindness guarantees these metrics (Appendix A).
8 Conclusions
We show that demographic information leaks into
intermediate representations of neural networks
trained on text data. Systems that train on text data
and do not want to condition on demographic in-
formation must take active steps against acciden-
tal conditioning. Our experiments suggest that:
(1) Adversarial training is effective for mitigating
protected attribute leakage, but, when dealing with
text data, may fail to remove it completely.
(2) When using the adversarial training method,
the adversary score during training cannot be
trusted, and must be verified with an externally-
trained attacker, preferably on unseen data.
(3) Tuning the capacity and weight of the adver-
sary, as well as using an ensemble of several ad-
versaries, can improve the results. However, no
single method is the most effective in all cases.
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A Standard Fairness Definitions and
Guarded Classifiers
In this work, we focus on creating a representa-
tion which is oblivious to some factor. We mea-
sure this by the term leakage which is defined in
Section 2 and say that a classifier is guarded in re-
spect to an attribute z if z is guarded and hasn’t
leaked. In this section, we show that this defi-
nition matches more common definitions of fair-
ness, under our setup. Specifically, we show that
under the setup we discuss, if z is guarded than
the classifier satisfies Demographic Parity, Equal-
ity of Odds and Equality of Opportunity.8
For completeness, we repeat these definitions
provided and redefined by Hardt et al. (2016),
Beutel et al. (2017) and Zhang et al. (2018):
Demographic Parity. A predictor f satisfies
demographic parity if f and z are independent:
P (f = yˆ|z = 0) = P (f = yˆ|z = 1)
Equality of Odds. A predictor f satisfies equal-
ity of odds if f and z are conditionally indepen-
dent of the main task label Y :
P (f = yˆ|z = 0, Y = y) =
P (f = yˆ|z = 1, Y = y), y ∈ {0, 1}
Equality of Opportunity. A predictor f satis-
fies equality of opportunity if f and z are condi-
tionally independent on a particular value Y :
P (f = yˆ|z = 0, Y = y) =
P (f = yˆ|z = 1, Y = y), y ∈ {0|1}
Recall that in all our data split setups, there is an
equal appearance of both y and z. We now claim
the following:
Lemma A.1. If a classifier is guarded to z in our
setup, it realizes demographic parity
Proof. The classifier is oblivious to z, meaning
that: P (Z|H) = 0.5, where H is the internal rep-
resentation. As in our setup, P (Z) = 0.5
⇒ P (Z) = P (Z|H)
therefore Z and H are independent.
8We note however that, as we discussed, achieving 0-
leakage is far from trivial.
From graphical models we know that Y and X
(the textual input), are independent givenH (sym-
metrically for Z and X), therefore we can over-
look X when conditioning on H . Also, we can
say that given H , Yˆ and Z are independent:
P (Yˆ , Z|H) = P (Yˆ |H)P (Z|H)
using bayes rule on both sides:
P (H|Yˆ , Z)P (Yˆ , Z)
P (H)
=
P (H|Yˆ )P (Yˆ )
P (H)
P (Z|H)
⇒ P (H|Yˆ , Z)P (Yˆ , Z) = P (H|Yˆ )P (Yˆ )P (Z|H)
and from the independency of Z and H , we get
that:
P (Yˆ , Z) = P (Yˆ )P (Z|H)
As Z and H are independent:
P (Yˆ , Z) = P (Yˆ )P (Z)
meaning that Yˆ and Z are independent
Lemma A.2. If a classifier is oblivious to z in our
setup, it realizes equality of odds.
Proof. If a classifier is oblivious to z, this means
that:
P (f = yˆ|z = 0) = P (f = yˆ|z = 1)
(from Lemma A.1), therefore, from the law of to-
tal probability:
P (f = yˆ|z = 0, y = 0) · P (y = 0)+
P (f = yˆ|z = 0, y = 1) · P (y = 1) =
P (f = yˆ|z = 1, y = 0) · P (y = 0)+
P (f = yˆ|z = 1, y = 1) · P (y = 1)
Since P (y = 0) = P (y = 1) = 0.5 in all
setups, we can get rid of P (y), and we get:
P (f = yˆ|z = 0, y = 0)+
P (f = yˆ|z = 0, y = 1) =
P (f = yˆ|z = 1, y = 0)+
P (f = yˆ|z = 1, y = 1)
and due to Lemma A.1 we get
P (f = yˆ|z = 0, y = 1) = P (f = yˆ|z = 1, y = 1)
(and similarly for y = 0).
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Lemma A.3. If a classifier is oblivious to z in our
setup, it realizes equality of opportunity.
Proof. As equality of opportunity is a relaxation
of equality of odds and is less strict then it, from
Lemma A.2, it holds automatically.
In conclusion, we showed that an oblivious
classifier on our setup would satisfy the three fair-
ness definitions which were introduced above.
B Implementation Details
Preprocessing We tokenize each tweet using
twokenize, a twitter specific tokenizer (O’Connor
et al., 2010; Owoputi et al., 2013), and discard du-
plicate tweets and tweets with less than three to-
kens.
Neural Network architecture and hyperparam-
eters Unless otherwise noted, both the LSTM
encoder and the MLP hidden layer have 300 hid-
den units with a single layer. We use randomly-
initialized 300-dimensional embeddings, and train
using SGD with Momentum (Qian, 1999) and a
learning rate of 0.01 for 100 epochs. We use
dropout (Hinton et al., 2012) of 0.2 on all hid-
den layers, and negative log likelihood as the loss
function with 32 sized mini-batch.
C Emojis Details
Figure 3 contains the different emojis we used for
defining positive and negative tweets. In addition
to those emojis, we also looked for the following
emoticons: :) :-) : ) :D =) as positive and :( :-( : (
:-( =( as negative
Positive Emojis
Negative Emojis
Figure 3: Emojis used as positive and negative
proxies for sentiment
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